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I. INTRODUCTION
Increased drug enforcement initiatives within the United States
parallel the international' escalation of the war on drugs.2 Curbing the
1. See generally Special Project, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey
of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1990).
2. The drug enforcement initiatives of the Reagan and Bush administrations commonly have
been couched in jingoistic terminology. The executive has referred to federal drug enforcement
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flow of narcotics into the country has seemed an unconquerable task.
The tremendous influx of illegal substances and the heightened domes-
tic production of both natural4 and synthetic' drugs prompt govern-
initiatives as the "War on Drugs" since an October 2, 1982, presidential radio broadcast by Ronald
Reagan from Camp David, Maryland. Introducing what he hailed as a bold new strategy to prevent
drug abuse and drug trafficking, the former president set the tone for drug enforcement rhetoric in
the 1980s when he said: "The mood toward drugs is changing in this country, and the momentum
is with us .... Drugs are bad, and we're going after them. As I've said before, we've taken down
the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs." President's
Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249, 1250
(Oct. 2, 1982); see also Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890-92 & n.10 (1987).
3. In his opening statement to a 1986 congressional hearing on federal drug control initia-
tives, Representative Charles B. Rangel, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control, decried the inadequacy of the federal response to the drug problem, citing
government estimates that 150 tons of cocaine, 12 tons of heroin, 30 to 60 tons of marijuana, and
200 tons of hashish would enter the United States in the coming year. The Federal War on Drugs;
Past, Present, and Future: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Con-
trol, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Federal War on Drugs Hearing] (opening state-
ment of Charles B. Rangel, Chairman). The Chairman called for federal action to address the
problem: "To win this war, we need a national commitment to a comprehensive anti-drug policy.
On the Federal level, this means an assertive foreign policy which promotes the eradication of
drugs in source countries and aggressive drug enforcement to halt the flow of narcotics across our
borders." Id. at 61.
Congress's 1986 Session passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which increased funds and
personnel devoted to the drug war with the goal of instituting an aggressive drug enforcement
policy. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. Despite dramatic across-
the-board increases in funding and personnel authorized by the bill, see HousE SELECT COMM. ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE
ACT OF 1986, at 1-10 (Comm. Print 1987), little success, measured in terms of reduction of drug use
or importation, has been shown. A 1987 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) publication on
intelligence collection pessimistically described the status of the war on drugs:
A survey of current public opinion leads unequivocally to the opinion that the war against the
narcotics traffic has been lost by law enforcement. Everyday one can find news articles on
previously unheard of quantities of all types of drugs being found or seized. These seizures
represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the actual volume of illegal drugs which are
being produced and sold, but which evade the attention of police authorities. It can be safely
concluded that the drug menace is a more significant threat to civilized societies than ever
before. This situation exists in spite of increased efforts on the part of law enforcement au-
thorities worldwide to stem the tide.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL
METHODS introduction (1987) (Intelligence Collection).
4. In 1987 the DEA reported a total of 71,845 marijuana plots sighted and 62,363 plots eradi-
cated in the United States. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1987 DOMESTIC
CANNABIS ERADICATION/SUPPRESSION PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 4 (1987). Even with the extensive
DEA eradication program, only one of nineteen DEA divisional offices reported diminished sup-
plies of marijuana during the same time period, id. at 20, and the wholesale price of marijuana
actually declined from 1986 levels. NAT'L NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE NNICC
REPORT 1987: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES 5 (1988) [hereinafter NNICC
REPORT 1987]. The number of plots sighted in 1988 declined to 48,349, of which 38,531 were eradi-
cated. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1988 DOMESTIC CANNABIS ERADICATION/
SUPPRESSION PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 5 (1988). The survey of DEA divisional offices in the 1988
report did not state whether supplies of marijuana were diminished for the same period. The re-
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ments at every level to attempt to restrict drug trafficking within the
United States.' The enforcement escalation is highlighted by a vocifer-
ous executive and congressional commitment to the eradication of the
drug problem, improved drug detection technology, and a dedication of
increased manpower and resources to enforcement efforts.'
Detecting illegal substances during transportation is a logical and
convenient focus of drug control efforts. Imports of drugs are concen-
trated along the coasts, through international airports, and along the
southern borders. After the drugs enter the United States drug traffick-
ers must transport their goods throughout the country for distribution. s
Seizing the opportunity to contain the flow of illegal substances, the
police and other drug enforcement officials enhance surveillance of com-
mercial transportation systems, highways, private planes, and boats in
port implied that the eradication program had not experienced overwhelming success, but sug-
gested that the fault lay with the criminal justice system:
The criminal justice system's laxity in dealing with offenders does not encourage defend-
ants to cooperate with authorities. Growers are aware that they face a minimal chance of
conviction and incarceration. Fines are viewed as a cost of doing business. There is no deter-
rence when the profit potential exceeds the potential loss. The lack of defendants cooperating
detracts from the intelligence data base regarding marijuana cultivation activities.
Id. at 20.
5. The number of clandestine drug laboratories producing drugs such as PCP,
methamphetamine, cocaine, and other chemically manufactured or refined drugs appears to be
increasing. Between 1984 and 1987, the number of laboratories seized in the United States rose
from 290 to 682. NNICC REPORT 1987, supra note 4, at 41. The NNICC reported that all of the
PCP and the majority of the methamphetamines and amphetamines illegally sold in the United
States are believed to be produced in clandestine laboratories. Id.
6. See generally The Drug Enforcement Crisis at the Local Level: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
7. President Bush enthusiastically assumed control of the drug war upon taking office. In a
recent address regarding drug control strategy, the President recommended extensive expansions
in the criminal justice system, drug-free workplace policies, drug abuse treatment services, and an
increase of 1990 funding to $7.9 billion, a $2.2 billion increase over 1989 levels. White House Fact
Sheet on the National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1308, 1308-10 (Sept. 5,
1989). Congress also has spent considerable time and energy addressing the drug problem. See,
e.g., National Drug Policy Board Strategy Plans: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Drug Policy Hearing];
Federal War on Drugs Hearing, supra note 3.
8. Trafficking trends vary depending on the drug and its source. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN.. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORTI. THE ILLICIT DRUG SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA, 1984-1986 (1987). Marijuana generally arrives in Florida via boat from Columbia or
by air from Jamaica and Belize, but most Mexican marijuana passes through Texas primarily by
land transportation. Id. at 6. Cocaine arrives primarily in South Florida, but also enters along the
Gulf Coast and the Southwest by air, boat, or land. Id. at 13. Heroin arrives primarily by commer-
cial air from Asia, though some Mexican heroin is shipped over land. Id. at 21. John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York is considered the primary entry point for heroin smuggled into
the United States. See Narcotics Trafficking Through John F. Kennedy Airport: Hearing Before
the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1987) (state-
ment of Arthur K. Stiffel, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Customs).
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order to detect couriers during transit.9 Increasingly, however, surveil-
lance efforts challenge established concepts of privacy.
Fourth amendment issues concerning drug enforcement surveil-
lance programs continually confront the courts. Agents fostering the ex-
traterritorial war on drugs act pursuant to the sovereign's right to
protect its borders, but consequently cause the diminution of the pri-
vacy rights of entrants.'0 Domestic travelers expect a greater degree of
privacy and freedom from governmental intrusion than those entering
the country." Not surprisingly, these expectations frequently clash with
expedient and effective drug enforcement efforts to stem the flow of
illegal drugs. Successful drug enforcement efforts inevitably intrude on
the privacy and security interests of the individual, raising questions of
when and how much intrusion is permissible.
During the last twenty years, the Supreme Court generally has re-
sponded by legitimizing increasingly intrusive enforcement activities.
Cases analyzing the constitutionality of searches of drug couriers typi-
cally have been fact specific, precluding the emergence of bright line
tests.' 3 Courts commonly utilize a balancing test to determine the
9. See Drug Policy Hearing, supra note 7, at 7-8 (testimony of Francis A. Keating II, Acting
Chairman of the Enforcement Coordinating Group of the Nat'l Drug Policy Board, describing the
DEA's drug interdiction system for air, land, and maritime smuggling).
10. In order to protect itself, the sovereign has plenary customs power and may control who
and what may enter the country. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-21 (1977). Conse-
quently, the customs service may conduct routine searches and seizures at the border without
probable cause or a warrant. See id. at 616-17.
11. One court stated:
Balanced against the sovereign's interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of
respondent. . . [N]ot only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the inte-
rior, the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the pri-
vacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the
border.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985) (citation omitted).
12. Supreme Court decisions significantly impacting the privacy rights of traveling passen-
gers include: Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and to a lesser extent
regarding passenger searches, but with increasing importance, New York v. Belton 453 U.S. 454
(1981). For a detailed discussion of each of these cases, see infra notes 97-103 and accompanying
text (Rodriguez); infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (Royer); infra notes 134-47 and accom-
panying text (Mendenhall); infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text (Terry); and infra notes 30-
31 and accompanying text (Belton).
13. Five factually similar cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1980 demonstrate the
Court's adherence to factual analysis and consequent inability to establish a controlling precedent
in cases involving DEA searches of drug couriers in airports. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544
(holding that a seizure had not occurred and that a search of the suspect was consensual). The
concurring opinion found a seizure justified by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); see also United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) (holding that the investigative stop
of suspect was justified by reasonable suspicion); Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 1 (holding that the inves-
tigative stop of suspect was justified by reasonable suspicion); Royer, 460 U.S. at 491 (holding that
a seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion, but agents exceeded the bounds of a temporary
1314
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proper extent of a search and whether the harm to be prevented by the
search outweighs any invasion of privacy.14 This trend suggests that
rules governing search and seizure are not static, rendering fourth
amendment rights increasingly difficult to delineate. Law enforcement
personnel, alert to the judiciary's shift from protecting privacy interests
to bolstering law enforcement, have little incentive to respect individual
privacy rights.15
investigatory detention by retaining the suspect's ticket and identification and asking him to ac-
company the agents away from the public corridor into a private room); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that the seizure of a suspect was unconstitutional because it was
not justified by reasonable suspicion). For a discussion of the Sokolow decision, see infra notes
107-18 and accompanying text.
Commentators have expressed similar dissatisfaction with the Court's balancing approach. See
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REv. 383 (1988). Professor Sundby explains that the limitless application of the reasona-
bleness balancing test approach to the fourth amendment originally articulated in Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), a case involving administrative inspections, and later applied to
the warrantless stop and search of an individual in Terry, has resulted in a "piecemeal approach to
fourth amendment analysis." Sundby, supra, at 406.
14. The Supreme Court first adopted a balancing test for fourth amendment analysis in a
case concerning a regulatory search. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White stated:
"[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails." Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. A year later the
Court applied the Camara balancing test to determine the constitutionality of a policeman's stop
and frisk of an individual believed to be planning an armed robbery. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Since
Terry, courts commonly have applied the balancing test to determine whether a search violates the
fourth amendment. See generally Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173
(1988); Sundby, supra note 13.
15. A Nashville attorney's experience illustrates potential abuses and dangers when individ-
ual rights are circumscribed under the fourth amendment. Three black male defendants had been
arrested for trafficking in cocaine after they were stopped by a highway patrolman on Interstate 65
in Williamson County, Tennessee. The defendants told their attorney that they had not violated
any traffic ordinances at the time that they were apprehended. After pulling them over, the patrol-
man separated them and searched the car. Finding cocaine, the officer arrested the suspects and
had them sign a consent to tow and search the car. The suspects later denied knowledge of the
consent to search. Suspecting that the investigatory stop and subsequent search were based on the
fact that three black men were driving a car with Florida license tags north on an interstate high-
way, the attorney decided to conduct his own investigation in order to support his theory that the
suspects impermissibly were seized and searched. The attorney hired a black male detective who,
with two black male schoolteachers, rented a Cadillac with Florida tags. The three men drove
north along the same portion of the interstate and were stopped on their first pass through Wil-
liamson County by the same patrolman. The officer ignored the detective's inquiries into the rea-
sons for the stop. The officer separated the three men and called for support. When the other
officers arrived, the first patrolman requested permission to search the vehicle. When the occu-
pants denied permission, the officer asked again commenting that if the occupants had nothing to
hide they should not object to an inspection of the car's contents. When the occupants refused
once again, the officer nevertheless proceeded to search the car as well as two closed suitcases in
the trunk and a paper bag in the back seat that had been stapled closed. After detaining the three
men for over 30 minutes without finding any illegal substances, the officer ticketed the driver for
an illegal lane change and failure to wear seat belts. When the detective later challenged the tick-
ets in court, the district attorney argued that because the detective was trying to get stopped, he
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Fourth amendment jurisprudence in the transportation context
suggests that there is little or no reasonable expectation of privacy dur-
ing travel via commercial transportation. 6 Recognized exceptions to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement are used to justify warrant-
less searches of passengers," luggage,' 8 and sleeping compartments. 19
Courts frequently apply the stop and frisk,2" consent, 21 and automo-
bile22 exceptions to justify searches in these situations. Subordinating
privacy interests to drug enforcement efforts alters the concept of
violated traffic laws in order to provoke the patrolman into initiating the investigation. The judge
refused to consider any evidence regarding the illegal search and upheld the traffic fines. Tele-
phone interviews with Dale Quillen, Esq., and Charles Scott, Private Detective (Jan. 4, 1990).
Regardless of whether the detective's or the patrolman's version of the story is more accurate,
the anecdote illustrates the potential for abuse inherent in both the current system for detecting
illegal drugs and the analysis of the legitimacy of governmental intrusion after it has been accom-
plished. While the detective may have had an incentive to violate traffic laws so that hi, investiga-
tion would produce the desired results, the patrolman equally was interested in vigorously
* -fending the legitimacy of his actions, possibly to the extent of fabricating charges against the
detective. Most drug searches, like this incident, are witnessed only by drug enforcement officials
and the suspects.
16. This Note does not suggest that the narrowing of fourth amendment protections is con-
fined to the context of commercial transportation. Stephen Wisotsky, Professor of Law at Nova
University in Florida, has argued persuasively that the war on drugs erodes privacy interests with
practices such as wiretapping, stopping cars on public highways, monitoring students and school
personnel, and creating data information systems to keep drug files on private citizens. See Wisot-
sky, supra note 2, at 913-19. Unlike these other contexts, however, airports have a brief but sub-
stantial history of surveillance and search dating back to the institution of systematic screening of
passengers as a measure to prevent skyjacking. See infra notes 69-96 and accompanying text. This
history and the similarity among the cases that arise from airport surveillance provide substantial
material from which trends in fourth amendment jurisprudence may be analyzed. It is also possi-
ble under the circumstances to review the predictions of commentators who suggested that
skyjacker screening systems would lead to an eventual demise in the right to privacy of airline
passengers. Id. Similar train station and bus terminal cases have been added to illustrate both the
expansion of drug surveillance in response to acceptance of DEA practices in airports and the
additional curtailment of privacy resulting from that development.
17. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam) (search of a passenger
justified by the stop and frisk exception).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (justifying a temporary seizure of
personal property under Terry); United States v. Johnson, 862 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3223 (1989) (applying the automobile exception to luggage in a bus terminal).
But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the automobile exception did
not justify the search of a trunk that had been taken to a police station after being seized from
train passengers who loaded it into a waiting automobile).
19. United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that an extension of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment justified the war-
rantless search of defendant's roomette on train); see also infra notes 156-65 and accompanying
text.
20. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
21. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see infra notes 191-92 and accompany-
ing text.
22. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The automobile exception may be applied
to airport or other commercial transportation searches to the extent that its rationale is based on
mobility. See infra notes 148-89 and accompanying text.
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fourth amendment rights in the context of commercial transportation.
Because airline, train, and bus transportation is intrinsically public,
drug interdiction programs have diminished passengers' expectations of
privacy substantially.
This Note primarily analyzes drug surveillance programs operated
in airports, but also examines surveillance in train stations and bus ter-
minals. Focusing on surveillance techniques and legal justifications for
searches of suspected drug couriers, this Note reviews the stop and frisk
doctrine, the development of airport surveillance and drug courier
profiles, the expansion of the automobile exception to commercial forms
of transportation, the use of investigatory stops, the legitimacy of con-
sensual searches, and the appropriateness of a balancing test for deter-
mining the reasonableness of any given search. The purpose of the
survey is to examine the impact of drug enforcement surveillance on
fourth amendment jurisprudence and to determine whether passengers'
seeming inability to vindicate unconstitutional searches23 negates any
meaningful right to privacy.2 4
II. KATZ-FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF PRIVACY
Before 1967, courts analyzed searches under the fourth amendment
as physical invasions. 25 If law enforcement officials did not physically
penetrate a secured area, a search did not occur, and the activity was
not governed by the strictures of the fourth amendment.26 The fourth
amendment applies only to actual searches and seizures2 7 and prohibits
23. This Note will not address the exclusionary rule, but will consider the general receptive-
ness of the judiciary to fourth amendment arguments.
24. Privacy is an elusive concept in the realm of fourth amendment jurisprudence. In Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court explained that the fourth amendment does not
translate into a general right to privacy, instead that which an individual "seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52;
see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (stating that "a fundamental purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of
legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the
home" (footnote omitted)); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (stating that "the
essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions
into his privacy") quoted in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
25. 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(a) (2d
ed. 1987); see also Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging Tri-
partite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1086-91 (1987); Recent Development, Florida v. Riley:
The Emerging Standard for Aerial Surveillance of the Curtilage, 43 VAND. L. REv. 275, 279-81
(1990).
26. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 2.1(a).
27. "The words 'searches and seizures' . . . are terms of limitation. Law enforcement prac-
tices are not required by the Fourth Amendment to be reasonable unless they are either 'searches'
or 'seizures.'" Id. § 2.1, at 299 (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)).
1990] 1317
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
those that are unreasonable.2 8 The fourth amendment does not limit
other law enforcement activity. Therefore, if an activity does not rise to
the level of a search or a seizure, it is not governed by the fourth
amendment.29
Under traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence, government
officials must have probable cause to believe that the subject of a search
is involved in illegal activity before searching the person or his prop-
erty.30 After a showing of probable cause, a magistrate may issue a war-
rant."1 Any search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable
unless the search falls within the scope of a recognized exception.32
In Katz v. United States"3 the Supreme Court reformulated fourth
amendment analysis by defining a search in terms of expectations of
privacy. 4 The petitioner, Katz, was convicted of transmitting wagering
information over the telephone.35 Without showing probable cause and
obtaining a warrant, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had
attached a listening device to the outside of the public telephone booth
from which the petitioner called.36 Because the agents in Katz did not
physically enter the booth, the lower courts determined that no search
had occurred.3 7 If the agents did not conduct a search, then a showing
of probable cause and a warrant were unnecessary. 8
On appeal the Supreme Court recognized that electronic technol-
ogy had rendered the physical trespass view of searches obsolete.3 9 Con-
sequently, Justice John Harlan's concurrence replaced the physical
trespass rule with a test focusing on an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.40 The Court found that a reasonable expectation of pri-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (stating that "[ilt is a first principle of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they first con-
vince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so").
31. Id.
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Wilkins, supra note 25, at 1086-91 (1987).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 348-49 (citing 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)).
38. Id.
39. The Court stated:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact
that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall
of the booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id. at 353; see also id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "reasonable expectations of
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion").
40. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1318 [Vol. 43:1311
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vacy exists regarding a conversation held from a public phone booth.41
Therefore, evidence obtained by the unlawful listening device was
inadmissible.42
Justice Harlan proposed a two-tier analysis that became the ac-
cepted formula for determining whether certain activity is a search. 3
The test first looks to an individual's actual, or subjective, expectation
of privacy, determining whether the individual knowingly exposed ac-
tivities, objects, or statements to the public.44 If an individual actually
expects to keep these activities, objects, or statements private, the ex-
pectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable.45 If an application
of the Katz test shows that an individual held an actual expectation of
privacy and that expectation was objectively reasonable, investigative
activity which intrudes upon that privacy will be considered a search.
Only if activity constitutes a search under the Katz test will courts ap-
ply the fourth amendment to determine whether the search was
reasonable.
III. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES CONDUCTED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE:
TERRY V. OHIO AND THE STOP AND FRISK DOCTRINE
The stop and frisk doctrine originated in 1968 in Terry v. Ohio."
In Terry the Supreme Court ruled that a policeman who has a reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous
may conduct a limited search of the individual, confined to a pat down
of the individual's outer clothes.4 7 The Court based its decision on con-
cern for the safety of police officers, 48 recognizing that practical precau-
tionary measures and the state interest in crime control necessitate
some limited right to search.49 Drawing the stop and frisk exception
narrowly, the Court limited its use to a search for weapons when an
officer reasonably suspects that the subject of the frisk is armed and
dangerous.50
41. Id. at 352.
42. Id. at 359.
43. Id. at 361.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Id. at 30-31.
48. The Court stated:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for
the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.
Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id. at 27.
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Under Terry, two strict criteria limit the stop and frisk exception. 1
First, the officer must have a specific and articulable justification for
the search.2 Based on the officer's experience, inferences may be made
regarding an individual's behavior.5 3 An inarticulate hunch, however,
will not justify an official invasion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen." Second, the scope of the search may
not exceed what the circumstances justify.5 5 Although the safety ration-
ale behind Terry is explicit, 6 it is no longer a necessary factor in the
Terry formula.57 The analysis for determining whether a stop and frisk
search is unconstitutionally intrusive balances governmental interest
against the degree of intrusion.58 Thus, governmental interests other
than police officer safety also might justify limited searches. Terry has
spawned its own line of cases incorporating the balancing test and the
reasonable suspicion requirement. 9 The safety rationale that originally
justified the stop and frisk exception, however, soon evaporated.60
51. Id. at 19-20.
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id. at 20. The Court described the acceptable extent of a search under the Terry circum-
stances as "a carefully limited search of the outer clothing. . . in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault [the police officer]." Id. at 30.
56. See supra note 48; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510 (1983) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (stating that "the purpose of the 'limited' weapons search was 'not to discover evidence of
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence'" (quoting Ad-
ams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972))); Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriv-
ing, Departing, or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REv. 1036, 1053 (1973) (stating that "Terry permitted a
narrow exception to the probable cause rule for the sole purpose of protecting the officer").
57. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99 (stating that the public interest in the suppression of ille-
gal drugs or any other serious crime will justify temporary detention for limited questioning);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that seizure
of defendant was justified because "[t]he public has a compelling interest in detecting those who
would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit").
58. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Critics have called for replacement of the balancing test with an
analysis requiring officials to use the least restrictive means because of the alleged overvaluation of
governmental needs and undervaluation of individual interests that occurs in the balancing analy-
sis. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Sundby, supra note 13.
60. In a Terry companion case, the Supreme Court found that a narcotics search "was not
reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have
justified its inception-the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man."
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1967) (emphasis added). Despite the uncompromising lan-
guage of Sibron, however, this view evolved into a general acceptance of Terry searches aimed at
detecting narcotics. The transition from Sibron to cases such as Royer and Mendenhall, see supra
note 57, seems to have been triggered initially by lower court rulings that permitted the admission
of narcotics discovered in the course of weapons frisks. As one author has noted: "After exhaus-
tively analyzing whether the information developed by the screening system justified a protective
weapons frisk of the defendant, the opinions then tended to reject summarily the argument that
any nonweapon contraband discovered should not be admissible in a criminal prosecution." Gora,
supra note 56, at 1050. Acceptance was particularly alarming at this early stage because statistics
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Many commentators initially rejected the validity of the dimin-
ished level of suspicion required by the stop and frisk exception espe-
cially as applied to possessory offenses when the suspect poses no
immediate safety threat."' Although the application of the stop and
frisk doctrine to possessory offenses is no longer an issue in fourth
amendment cases, critics continue to fear that the combination of an
unavoidably subjective balancing test with a suspicion requirement less
exacting than probable cause may give rise to automatic acceptance of
completed and successful searches.6 2 Generally, if contraband was dis-
covered, then suspicion must have been reasonable.6 3
The debate regarding the reasonable suspicion standard has been
attenuated, especially in cases involving drug couriers.6 4 Views concern-
ing the importance of the governmental interest in detecting illicit drug
couriers differ substantially.6 5 Much of the early debate addressed the
validity of expanding Terry to allow limited searches of individuals sus-
pected of carrying drugs."6 The Court resolved that debate by determin-
suggested that officials who screened passengers were frequently looking not for weapons, but for
drugs. Id. at 1053.
61. Justice William Douglas, the sole dissenter in Terry, objected to the Court's empowering
the police to conduct a search based on less than probable cause. "We hold today that the police
have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a 'search' than a judge has to authorize
such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again." Terry, 392 U.S. at 36
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Later, however, the Court's subtle expansion of the
stop and frisk doctrine brought more dissension. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Douglas, objected to the search of an individual
suspected of concealing a weapon, but who posed no immediate threat to the officer or the public.
Id. at 159 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that in order for a search to satisfy
Terry requirements, the suspect must be "both armed and dangerous." Id. (emphasis in original);
see also Gora, supra note 56, at 1052-53.
62. See Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, As
All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye", 65 N.C.L. REv. 417, 469-70 (1987).
63. Id. Conversely, if no contraband is discovered, courts are more likely to find suspicion
unreasonable. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (holding that the seizure and unsuccessful
frisk of a suspect was unreasonable after no contraband was discovered). Because victims of unrea-
sonable searches are unlikely to report the intrusion and little recourse exists for those who do,
courts will rarely face situations such as Brown in which a search fails to reveal contraband. See
infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587-88 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the majority's finding of reasonable suspicion in upholding the conviction of the
defendant "diminishes the rights of all citizens 'to be secure in their persons' as they traverse the
Nation's airports" (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). See generally Becton, supra note 62.
65. See generally Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1988) (contain-
ing testimony for and against the legalization of illegal drugs); see also France, Should We Fight or
Switch?, A-B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 43 (discussing the pros and cons of legalizing drugs in light of the
perceived failures of the war on drugs).
66. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 488, 498 (1983) (stating that "Terry created a limited
exception to [the fourth amendments probable cause requirement]: certain seizures are justifiable
under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is
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ing that governmental interests other than officer safety may outweigh
individual privacy interests so that a limited search is justified. The
issue now central to a court's analysis of a Terry search is limited to the
question of whether suspicion was reasonable."'
A. The Origins of Airport Surveillance
Because of an increase in hijackings, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) in 1968 developed a "skyjacker personality profile" in or-
der to identify individuals who posed a potential safety risk. 9
Additionally, many airlines began using magnetometers either selec-
tively, through application of the profile, or comprehensively in order to
determine whether passengers carried weapons.7" Persons meeting the
profile characteristics or identified as carrying metal by the magnetome-
ter could be frisked and their hand luggage searched.
7 1
The institution of these precautionary measures provoked outcries
from civil libertarians who found the searches inconsistent with fourth
amendment values. 2 Despite the encroachment on privacy rights, how-
ever, courts in the early 1970s were persuaded that the threat of hijack-
ings and terrorist attacks justified the airport searches. 3 When searches
for weapons produced drug stashes instead of handguns, courts usually
allowed admission of the evidence to secure narcotics convictions. 4
about to commit a crime"). Justice Thurgood Marshall, who framed the strong dissent in Adams,
joined the Royer majority that stated the general rule. See supra notes 57 & 61.
67. In the early 1970s, for example, courts found that the threat posed by hijackers justified
extensive screening systems in the Nation's airports. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1581 (1989); United States v. Moore, 872 F.2d 251 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Tomaszewski, 833 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that suspicious
behavior gave rise not only to reasonable suspicion, but actually gave officers probable cause to
conduct a search).
69. See Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1004
(1973); Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039
(1971). Initially, the FAA relied on profiles to pinpoint potential hijackers, but eventually it insti-
tuted a comprehensive screening system whereby all passengers were searched via magnetometer
(metal detector). Ironically, the implementation of the widescale magnetometer search generated
more controversy than the searches based on the profile. See Andrews, Screening Travelers at the
Airport to Prevent Hijacking: A New Challenge for the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 16
ARIZ. L. REV. 657, 660-61 (1974); Gora, supra note 56.
70. See Note, supra note 69, at 1040.
71. See Andrews, supra note 69, at 660-61.
72. See Gora, supra note 56, at 1038.
73. See id. at 1039-46.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that cocaine
discovered after defendant triggered magnetometer was properly admitted against defendant in his
trial for possession of cocaine); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.) (upholding conviction
of defendant for drug charges based on heroin discovered in airport antihijacker search), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); see also Gora, supra note 56, at 1043. But see United States v. Kroll,
351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (overturning defendant's conviction for possession of amphet-
amines because scope of search was excessive), afl'd, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973). One author
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Noting the FAA's success in interdicting potential hijackers as well as
the frequent interception of illegal drugs in the process, the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) recognized an opportunity to estab-
lish its own surveillance program targeted at drug couriers rather than
hijackers.75
B. The Drug Courier Profile As a Basis for Reasonable Suspicion
1. The DEA Drug Courier Profile
The DEA initiated a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers
in 1974.78 The DEA compiled profiles of ostensibly objective character-
istics likely to be displayed by individuals who illegally transport drugs.
The profiles were designed to provide guidelines for the detection of
drug couriers by agents assigned to airports.77 Theoretically, persons
displaying characteristics associated with drug couriers provide reasona-
ble cause for suspicion.78 Under Terry, if suspicion based on conformity
with the supposedly objective characteristics is considered reasonable,
then a limited search is justified.
Several characteristics distinguish the use of drug courier profiles
from the hijacker personality profile. 79 First, the threat posed by drug
couriers is not related to their status as passengers on commercial
transport. Therefore, any threat posed by drug couriers is not as imme-
diate as the threat of hijacking. Second, the FAA generally used the
hijacker personality profile as one factor in a multipart evaluation of
suspects.80 Suspects selected by the hijacker profile usually were asked
for identification and tested with a magnetometer81 before more intru-
sive searches were conducted.8 2 Third, the FAA profile was much nar-
noted that the majority of arrests generated from the use of the hijacker profile were for possession
of drugs or violation of other nonrelated laws. Gora, supra note 56, at 1037.
75. See Greene & Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Courier Profile: History and Analysis, 22 S. TEx.
L.J. 261, 269 (1982).
76. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 9.3.
77. DEA Special Agent Paul Markonni is credited with creating the original drug courier
profile while assigned to surveillance duty at Detroit International Airport. See Greene & Wice,
supra note 75, at 269-70.
78. See Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial
Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U.L. REv. 843, 848 (1985).
79. See Note, Miles of White Lines: Use of the Drug Courier Profile by State Law Enforce-
ment Agencies on the Highway As Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Motorists, 30 ARiz. L. REv.
949, 951-52 (1988). Unlike the drug courier profile, elements of the skyjacker personality profile
were never made public. Id. at 951 n.14, 965-66. Therefore, comparisons between the two mecha-
nisms are speculative to some degree.
80. See id. at 951.
81. The magnetometer, or metal detector, is a less intrusive form of search than a body
search. It does not require the suspect to disrobe or to be physically touched in any way.
82. See Andrews, supra note 69, at 660-61.
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rower than the DEA counterpart.8 3 Only one-half of one percent of air
travelers fit the FAA's hijacker profile. 4 The DEA profile, on the other
hand, does not appear to be nearly as selective. 5 Finally, the FAA pro-
gram targeted only those persons who actually were going to board a
plane, but the DEA profile may be applied to anyone who enters the
airport terminal.88
The Supreme Court appears hesitant to endorse unconditionally
the use of drug courier profiles to establish reasonable suspicion. The
Court first addressed the profile as a legitimate basis for establishing
reasonable suspicion in Reid v. Georgia. A DEA agent in the Atlanta
airport identified the defendant Reid and his companion as potential
drug couriers because they displayed certain profile characteristics.8 A
subsequent search revealed that the suspects were carrying cocaine. 9
The Supreme Court held that the investigatory stop was not justified
by reasonable suspicion. 0 Reasoning that many innocent passengers
could be subjected to intrusive searches if suspicion based on inherently
innocent activity were deemed reasonable, the Court found that the
profile characteristics displayed by the defendant provided an inade-
83. See Gora, supra note 56, at 1040.
84. See id.
85. See Becton, supra note 62, at 418.
86. A consent rationale generally justified hijacker screening searches. Although courts dif-
fered on the point at which consent became irrevocable, all courts agreed "that up to some point a
traveler [was] free to leave and that screening ultimately rest[ed] on the consent manifested by a
choice to continue beyond that point." Andrews, supra note 69, at 664.
87. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). The Court decided United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980), a month earlier. Mendenhall also involved the use of drug courier profile in an
airport setting. In Mendenhall, however, the Court never reached the issue of whether the profile
supported reasonable suspicion. Instead, the Court ruled that the agents' stop of the defendant
was not a seizure. Id. at 554; see infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
88. Reid, 448 U.S. at 439. Reid arrived on an early flight when surveillance is perceived to be
low, carried a shoulder bag, and occasionally looked backward at a man behind him who carried an
identical bag. The second man caught up with Reid and spoke with him briefly before the two
exited the terminal. Id. A DEA agent approached the two men, asked to see their identification
and airline tickets, and requested consent to a search. The two men initially agreed to accompany
the agent back into the terminal and permit him to conduct a body search and a luggage inspec-
tion. Id. The agent saw that the men had spent only one day in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and that
they seemed nervous when he spoke to them. Id.
89. Id. Upon entering the terminal, the petitioner ran in an attempt to evade the officers. He
abandoned the shoulder bag he had carried before the agent apprehended him. The agent searched
the abandoned bag and discovered that it contained cocaine. Id. Although there is no privacy
interest in abandoned property, if the initial stop constituted an illegal seizure, the evidence dis-
covered subsequently was tainted by this illegality and was thus inadmissible. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983).
90. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; see also Cloud, supra note 78, at 865 & n.93. Although the Fulton
County Superior Court originally suppressed evidence on a motion by the defendant, the Georgia
Court of Appeals found that reasonable suspicion justified the investigatory stop. State v. Reid,
149 Ga. App. 685, 686, 255 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
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quate basis for reasonable suspicion."
In Florida v. Royer92 the Supreme Court determined that because
the defendant's characteristics fit the drug courier profile, suspicion was
reasonable. 3 Because DEA agents took Royer to a secluded room, how-
ever, Royer's confinement exceeded the bounds of an investigative
seizure. 4 Drug investigators were justified in temporarily detaining the
suspect for questioning under the Terry standard,95 but the Court
noted that a lawful seizure cannot be excessive in scope and duration. 6
2. Legitimization of the DEA's Airport Surveillance Program
In Florida v. Rodriguez97 the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida
state trial court wrongfully suppressed evidence obtained by police of-
ficers who stopped to question defendants after observing them speak
furtively to one another and attempt to evade the officers.9 The Court
strongly endorsed the right of a police officer to detain temporarily an
individual suspected of carrying drugs.9 Although the Court never re-
ferred explicitly to a profile, certain characteristics identified by the po-
lice officers as suspicious, terms such as "source city,"'100 and the fact
that the police officers had special training in narcotics surveillance and
apprehension suggest that suspicion was in fact based on the display of
profile characteristics.' 0 ' Regardless of whether the use of a profile pro-
vided the basis for the stop, the Court's opinion nevertheless reflects a
willingness to deem characteristics commonly contained on profile lists
as a basis for reasonable suspicion. 02 Rodriguez may be viewed as an
intentional legitimization of the DEA's airport surveillance program. 10
91. The Court found that the basis for suspicion was "simply too slender a reed to support
the seizure in this case." Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
92. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
93. Id. at 502-03.
94. Id. at 503.
95. Id. at 502.
96. Id.
97. 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 5 (stating that "a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an airport
search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, and is permissible be-
cause of the 'public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any
other serious crime'" (citation omitted) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99)).
100. The term "source city" is commonly used to designate a city from which dealers ship
drugs to a "use city," or place of sale. Becton, supra note 62, at 420 n.19.
101. See id. at 422.
102. See id.
103. Rodriguez has an unusual procedural history. The case came to the Supreme Court on
an appeal by the State of Florida. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 2. A Florida trial judge originally ex-
cluded evidence that had been found on the defendant Rodriguez after hearing testimony by the
narcotics officer involved in the investigation. Id. The trial court ruled that no reasonable suspicion
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The use of drug courier profiles as a basis for suspicion arouses
much skepticism among legal commentators. 104 Although the compila-
tion of characteristics that comprise the drug courier profile suggests an
objective basis for determining whether suspicion of any individual is
reasonable, studies demonstrate that the profiles are susceptible to ma-
nipulation.10 5 Thus, the profiles lend an arguably false sense of legiti-
macy to searches based on no more than an artfully disguised hunch.10
In United States v. Sokolow 0 7 the display of profile characteristics
motivated drug enforcement agents to perform a search. The Court re-
fused to address the DEA's use of a drug courier profile,108 but simply
determined that the agents had reasonable suspicion to search the de-
fendant. 09 The Court's inquiry focused on whether factors articulated
by the agents who stopped and searched the suspect constituted reason-
able suspicion."0
existed to justify a constitutional search of the defendant. Id. at 4. The Florida district court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Id. at 2. Because the Florida Supreme Court does
not hear cases involving trial judge error, but relies on the district courts of appeal to oversee such
error, Florida's Attorney General appealed the case to the Supreme Court. Id. at 10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court did not possess the
supervisory responsibility for acting in a pure error-correcting capacity for cases arising from a
state tribunal. Id. at 7. He also criticized what he perceived to be the majority's preoccupation
with the need to punish drug couriers. Id. Justice Stevens focused not on the merits of the case,
but on the inappropriateness of the Court's reviewing factual findings of a state trial court de novo.
Id. at 12. "The unusual action the Court takes today illustrates how far the Court may depart from
its principal mission when it becomes transfixed by the specter of a drug courier escaping the
punishment that is his due." Id. at 7. "The single-minded achievement of results in individual
cases is not a virtue that should characterize the work of this Court." Id. at 13. Justice Stevens was
joined by Justice William Brennan. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented without a written opin-
ion. Id. at 7.
104. See, e.g., Becton, supra note 62; Cloud, supra note 78.
105. See Becton, supra note 62, at 438. For an empirical analysis of the drug courier profile,
see generally Cloud, supra note 78, at 884-920. Professor Cloud concludes that the characteristics
are too broad to have meaning and reflect subjective evaluations of behavior by the police rather
than objective criteria. Id. at 920.
106. See Cloud, supra note 78, at 884.
107. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
108. The Court stated:
We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the agents'
belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA's "drug courier profiles." A court
sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate
the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a
"profile" does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained
agent.
Id. at 1587 (footnote & citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1586. Focusing on the majority analysis in Rodriguez, Professor Cloud suggested
that an approach that evaluates the reasonableness of suspicion without considering the influence
of the DEA profile is consistent with traditional fourth amendment methodology and most effec-
tively balances the competing interests of the government and the individual. Cloud, supra note
78, at 882.
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Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall dissented, criti-
cizing the majority for its failure to confront whether drug courier
profiles may establish reasonable suspicion.11' The dissent found the
profiles suspect because of their susceptibility to manipulation,11 reli-
ance on stereotypes,113 and potential to target innocent passengers." 4 In
a brief survey of federal cases, the dissent illustrates how profile charac-
teristics not only vary from case to case but frequently are contradic-
tory." 5 Three of the cases cited, for example, identify the timing of the
exit from the plane as one of the profile characteristics displayed by a
particular defendant."' One case finds it significant that the defendant
was the last to deplane, another that he was the first, and a third that
he exited in the middle. 1 7 The dissent concludes that reasonable suspi-
cion derived from inherently innocent behavior, which happens to con-
form to an unproven and demonstrably flawed profile, undermines
constitutional protections under the fourth amendment." 8
3. Train and Bus Surveillance
Although the majority of commercial transportation drug courier
cases address passengers traveling on commercial airlines, cases recently
have arisen concerning train or bus passengers." 9 Drug courier profiles
are applied in train stations despite the reduced significance of some of
the designated characteristics when removed from the original airport
context. 20 Some courts find that a suspect's exhibition of drug courier
111. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1589 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1588.
113. Id. Justice Thurgood Marshall implies that the majority has succumbed to the persua-
siveness of impermissible stereotypes as well, pointing to the repeated mention of the black jump-
suit and gold jewelry worn by Sokolow in the majority opinion. Id. at 1590.
114. Id. at 1588.
115. Id. at 1588-89.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (suspect was last to deplane);
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (suspect was first to deplane), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980)
(suspect deplaned from middle).
118. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1590-91.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defendant caught with
drugs on train); United States v. Johnson, 862 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988) (police discovered cocaine
in defendants' luggage in bus station), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3223 (1989); United States v. Ham-
mock, 860 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant caught with drugs aboard bus); United States v.
Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.) (defendant caught with drugs on train), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
534 (1988).
120. See United States v. Tavolacci, 704 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1988) (referring to drug in-
terdiction unit of the Amtrak police department that targets potential drug couriers traveling via
train). Profile characteristics identified in cases involving train passengers mirror those seen in the
airport drug courier profile. See, e.g., Colyer, 878 F.2d at 471 (defendant departed from "source
city," made reservation the day before departing, and paid for his ticket with cash a few minutes
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profile characteristics sufficiently merits a finding of reasonable suspi-
cion.'21 Others recognize problems in adopting this simple approach.122
In United States v. Tavolacci 123 one court found that drug enforce-
ment agents had reasonable suspicion to detain and question a defend-
ant who purchased a one-way ticket on Amtrak from Florida to
Chicago. The investigating agent articulated the following factors as the
basis for his decision: twenty-four hours before departure, the defend-
ant reserved for himself an expensive roomette usually occupied by two
persons; he paid for the ticket with cash; he left an invalid callback
number; and he could make the trip more quickly by plane than by
Amtrak.124 The agent alerted Amtrak police, who detained the suspect
in order to search his luggage with a drug sniffing dog.125
In a similar case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court found in
United States v. Battista126  that suspicion raised by a passenger
targeted as a drug courier did not rise to the level of reasonable suspi-
cion. In Battista, however, the agents did not rely on the drug courier
profile to initiate a search of the suspect, but brought a drug dog to the
before departure); United States v. Trayer, 701 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (D.D.C. 1988) (defendant paid
for ticket with cash the evening before departure); United States v. Liberto, 660 F. Supp. 889, 890-
91 (D.D.C. 1987) (defendant paid for ticket with cash, left no call-back number or address). Al-
though few train cases exist, a common characteristic identified as suspicious is the defendant's
payment in cash. Although an airline passenger who pays for expensive tickets with cash may
justifiably raise suspicion, see Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1583 (defendant paid $2100 in cash for two
tickets), paying for less expensive train tickets with cash is less startling and arguably should not
be sufficient to justify a search of the passenger. See, e.g., Colyer, 878 F.2d at 471 (defendant paid
$210 for ticket); Trayer, 701 F. Supp. at 251 (defendant paid $327 for ticket).
121. See, e.g., Tavolacci, 704 F. Supp. at 246 (holding that the defendant's conformity with a
drug courier profile, nervousness, and attempt to explain alias when questioned by police suffi-
ciently justified a Terry search).
122. See, e.g., Trayer, 701 F. Supp. at 254 n.7 (stating that "it is very doubtful that the
officers, based solely upon the drug courier profile information, had a reasonable suspicion which
would have permitted the search"). Note that in the few train cases, courts usually have avoided
close inspection of the drug courier profile. Because train passengers ride in roomettes adjacent to
public corridors on the train, drug agents first identify suspected couriers by applying the profiles.
Agents then board the train with a drug dog, which sniffs the vents to the roomette. If the dog
signals an alert, inspectors have probable cause to search the roomette. See Colyer, 878 F.2d at
469; United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Whitehead, 849
F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988). Several courts have held that the use of drug dogs in the public corridor
of a train is not a search because there is no intrusion upon a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the corridor and a diminished expectation of privacy within the roomette as compared to a home
or hotel room. See, e.g., Colyer, 878 F.2d at 469 (holding that sniff by drug dog at the door of
roomette was not a search and did not, therefore, implicate fourth amendment concerns); White-
head, 849 F.2d at 849 (holding that police did not have to have probable cause before they could
bring a drug dog into a sleeping compartment because of the reduced expectation of privacy on a
train, minimal intrusiveness of the search, and the law enforcement interest at stake).
123. 704 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1988).
124. Id. at 247.
125. Id. at 248.
126. 876 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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door of the defendant's room. 12 The dog's positive response from snif-
fing an air vent rather than the profile characteristics gave the agents
probable cause to confront the suspect, who then consented to a search
of his compartment.'"
4. Diminution of Travelers' Privacy Expectations
Despite criticism of the drug courier profile and the Supreme
Court's refusal to endorse the profile explicitly, case law evidences the
overwhelming acceptance of the profile in cases involving commercial
passengers.'2 9 The acceptance of the profile may be attributed not only
to the present uncompromising political attitude toward drugs, but also
to the perception that passengers on commercial transport do not have
the same privacy interests as persons in their homes or even on the
street.
When commentators in the 1970s criticized the FAA's hijacker sur-
veillance program, they suggested that systematic searches would condi-
tion passengers to expect a lesser degree of privacy when traveling and
therefore erode constitutional protections under Katz.130 Judicial analy-
sis of cases under the drug courier profile suggests that this prediction
has come true. In his dissent in Royer, for example, Justice Harry
Blackmun states that the defendant was apprehended in an interna-
tional airport where, "due in part to extensive anti-hijacking surveil-
lance and equipment, reasonable privacy expectations are of
significantly lesser magnitude."'31 If surveillance for hijackers served to
lessen the expectation of privacy of commercial passengers, then the
new wave of drug surveillance possibly will serve to further circum-
scribe, if not obliterate completely, the fourth amendment rights of
commercial passengers.
IV. INVESTIGATORY STOP OR VOLUNTARY ENCOUNTER?: MENDENHALL
AND THE FREE TO LEAVE DOCTRINE
From Rodriguez to Sokolow, the Supreme Court's recent en-
counters with cases addressing limited searches of drug couriers confirm
127. Id. at 203.
128. Id. at 206.
129. An acceptance of the use of drug courier profiles to target suspects on highways is also
growing. See Note, supra note 79.
130. Andrews, supra note 69, at 707-12. Professor Andrews suggests, but strongly rejects, the
possibility that actual police practices should determine the extent of constitutional protection
awarded under the Katz test. He does, however, concede that conditioning air travel on consent to
even a limited search constitutes an erosion of fourth amendment protections. See id.
131. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
quoted in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984).
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the rule that drug enforcement agents may conduct an investigatory
stop and a limited search of passengers reasonably suspected of traffick-
ing in illegal drugs. Traditionally, however, the Court has refused to
characterize certain police confrontations with citizens as seizures re-
quiring justification under the fourth amendment. 1 2 When a confronta-
tion does not reach the level of a search or seizure, whether suspicion is
reasonable is not an issue. 133
The Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall34 established
that if in view of all the circumstances a reasonable person would feel
that he was "free to leave," no seizure has occurred. 35 In Mendenhall
two DEA agents approached the defendant after determining that she
demonstrated characteristics common to drug couriers. 3 6 Mendenhall
was a twenty-two year old black woman with less than a high school
education.137 The two male agents, both of whom were white, identified
themselves, asked to see the suspect's drivers license and ticket, and,
after noting a discrepancy between the two, returned the items and
asked if she would accompany them to the airport's DEA office." 8' The
Supreme Court found that the agents did not seize the defendant when
they asked her to accompany them to their office.'3 9 Articulating the
"free to leave" doctrine, the Court found that unless some display of
force or show of authority curtails an individual's freedom of move-
ment, no seizure has occurred. 4 ° Absent a search or a seizure, the activ-
132. "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). This language was reiterated by the Court in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980), when it established the free to leave doctrine.
133. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
134. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
135. Id. at 554.
136. Id. at 547 & n.1.
137. Id. at 558; see also infra note 144.
138. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48, 558. At the office, the agent asked Mendenhall if she
would consent to a search of her person and her handbag, but explained that Mendenhall was not
required to consent. Id. at 548. Mendenhall agreed to the search. A female officer arrived to con-
duct the body search and again asked the defendant whether she consented. Id. at 548-49. Men-
denhall said that she did consent, but when told that she would have to disrobe stated that she
had a plane to catch. Id. at 549. The female officer replied that if Mendenhall carried no drugs,
there would not be a problem, at which point the suspect disrobed, removed packages containing
heroin from her undergarments, and handed them to the policewoman. Id.
The district court convicted the defendant on the basis of the discovered evidence. Id. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the agents' request that the suspect accompany
them to another room constituted an arrest. Id. at 549-50. The arrest was unconstitutional because
it lacked probable cause. Id. at 550. Consequently, the defendant's consent was invalid, and the
evidence discovered was tainted and inadmissible. Id. Both lower court opinions were unpublished.
Id. at 549.
139. Id. at 557-58.
140. Id. at 554. Ironically, the Court determined that Mendenhall should have believed that
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ity is not subject to the reasonableness requirements of the fourth
amendment.""
Mendenhall effectually legitimized the practice of approaching and
questioning suspected drug traffickers, an important development re-
garding the legitimization of drug-targeted surveillance efforts. Pro-
vided that officers do not display force, they may question suspects and
request permission to search a suspected drug courier's person or be-
longings.142 Any suspicion raised during an officer's contact with a citi-
zen may give rise to reasonable suspicion and legitimize a frisk or other
cursory search, which may produce probable cause for which the officer
may place the suspect under arrest.143
The free to leave doctrine, while conceptually sound, is trouble-
some in application. The assertion that most persons in Mendenhall's
situation should feel free to leave absent a display of force rings
hollow.'44 Consequently, although few critics suggest that every con-
frontation should constitute a seizure, many would argue that courts
should weigh facts in a manner more favorably disposed towards the
citizen rather than attribute to the citizen a freedom to leave that he or
she is unlikely to feel when confronted by an officer. 45
Dissension on this issue stems from differing perceptions of what
she was free to leave even though the DEA agent responsible for the arrest testified that he in-
tended to detain the respondent if she attempted to leave. Id. at 575 n.12 (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting excerpt from cross-examination of DEA Agent Anderson). The dissent argued that Men-
denhall's acquiescence to authority should not be equated with consent. Id. at 566-67.
141. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
142. The law is unclear about whether a failure to cooperate will give agents reasonable sus-
picion to search the suspect. Reason dictates that this flagrant bootstrapping should not be the
case or suspects will find themselves in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation.
Mendenhall, however, leaves open the idea that refusal to cooperate may provide adequate suspi-
cion. But see United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Royer for the proposi-
tion that refusal to cooperate would not furnish a basis for detention).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that officers'
initial contact with the passenger at the door of his sleeping cabin was consensual and that an
investigative stop was justified after officers discovered that the suspect was traveling under an
alias); United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (holding that the initial
approach and questioning of the defendant did not constitute a seizure for fourth amendment
purposes, but suspect's subsequent lying about his true identity was a violation of local law and
gave the agent probable cause to arrest and search the defendant).
144. In its analysis the Court briefly considered then rejected the defendant's argument that
she was not free to leave. The Court stated:
[I]t is argued that the incident would reasonably have appeared coercive to the respondent,
who was 22 years old and had not been graduated from high school. It is additionally sug-
gested the respondent, a female and a Negro, may have felt unusually threatened by the
officers, who were white males. While these factors were not irrelevant, neither were they
decisive . ...
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted).
145. See Becton, supra note 62, at 467-69; Comment, Reformulating Seizures-Airport Drug
Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1486, 1493-1502 (1981).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1311
the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure entails. Those who
advocate the legitimacy of the investigatory encounter suggest that the
fourth amendment has little to do with privacy and a great deal to do
with property.'46 On the other hand, those who desire greater restric-
tions on the use of the investigatory encounter believe that the fourth
amendment essentially entitles the individual to be free from govern-
mental intrusion unless openly flaunting disrespect for the law.14 How
much privacy individuals should retain and under what circumstances
government intrusion should be permitted remain the core of each
fourth amendment inquiry.
V. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSPORTATION-MOBILITY As AN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE
Prompted by the intrinsic mobility of automobiles, the Supreme
Court in Carroll v. United States14 ruled that officers can conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile if they have probable cause to be-
lieve that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. The Court reasoned
that securing a warrant before such a search is impractical because evi-
dence quickly can be removed from the jurisdiction. 149 Failure to secure
a warrant, therefore, is justified in order to prevent the removal or de-
struction of evidence. 150 In Carroll the Supreme Court created the auto-
mobile exception to the fourth amendment long before most United
States citizens owned cars.
As society has become increasingly mobile and transient, the scope
of the automobile exception has broadened to incorporate searches of
146. This conclusion is not immediately apparent as courts continue to couch fourth amend-
ment analysis in terms of privacy. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (stating that "[a]s long as the
person to whom questions are put remains free to ... walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy"). Obviously the Supreme Court of today has rejected con-
cepts of the fourth amendment previously reflected in opinions. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
758 (1985) (stating that "[t]he fourth amendment protects 'expectations of privacy'-the individ-
ual's legitimate expectations that in certain places and at certain times he has 'the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men'" (citation
omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Some commentators have identified a shift back to a trespass view of the fourth amendment in
which legitimate privacy interests are given little weight. See Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based
Search Analysis Under the Open View Doctrine: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 191 (1988).
147. Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan continuously have endorsed this view
in their largely unsuccessful effort to steer the Court back towards a pure privacy based analysis.
See United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587-91 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 545-67 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. at 566-77 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens).
148. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).




closed containers within a car, 1' 1 mobile homes, 15 and searches con-
ducted even after a vehicle is controlled by authorities and the threat of
mobility extinguished. 1 3 To justify searches of automobiles even after
the removal of any mobility threat, the Court adopted a post-Katz the-
ory that individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in their
automobiles because of the automobile's primary function as a means of
transportation and the government's interest in automobile
regulation.154
Some courts justify warrantless searches of passengers or luggage
by reasoning that these searches closely parallel the automobile excep-
tion.'515 Mobility and governmental interest in regulation easily adapt to
the commercial transportation context. Thus, courts are beginning to
apply the automobile exception in the context of commercial
transportation.
In United States v. Tartaglia56 the District of Columbia Circuit
applied the automobile exception to justify a warrantless search of the
defendant's roomette on a passenger train. After reviewing the passen-
ger manifest, an Amtrak police officer targeted a passenger who had
paid cash for a ticket from Miami to New York.' 57 Several officers inter-
cepted the train during a brief early morning stop in Washington,
D.C.'58 The officers boarded the train with a drug sniffing dog, which
alerted the officers to the presence of narcotics at the vent of the sus-
pect's roomette.' 5 The inspector searched the roomette and discovered
five hundred grams of cocaine in a closed knapsack under the bed.'60
The defendant claimed that the inspector and officers violated his
151. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
152. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
153. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
154. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 854-55 (4th Cir.) (holding that mo-
bility of trains and regulation of train travel meant that roomette should be treated more like an
automobile than a home or hotel room for fourth amendment purposes), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
534 (1988); United States v. Johnson, 862 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a warrantless
search of a bus passenger's luggage was justified because suspects were about to catch a bus);
United States v. Trayer, 701 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that the distinction in fourth
amendment jurisprudence between fixed and mobile locations meant that a train passenger has
only a limited expectation of privacy). But see Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13-15 (stating that the treat-
ment of automobiles differs from that of other property, and generally a search is not justified if it
is remote in time or place from the reason for its inception).
156. 864 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 839.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 840. When the suspect answered, the inspector identified himself as a police of-
ficer and asked Tartaglia if he would consent to a search of the compartment. When Tartaglia
refused, the inspector asked him to dress and exit the compartment. Id.
160. Id. Tartaglia was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at 838-39.
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fourth amendment rights by searching the private roomette on the train
without first securing a warrant. 6 ' The court first held that the officers
had probable cause to search Tartaglia's room based on both an out-of-
service callback number listed for the defendant and the drug dog's
alert at the roomette door. 6 2 Citing the train's brief stop at the Wash-
ington, D.C. station and the possibility that the suspected drugs might
be removed, the court applied the automobile exception to uphold the
reasonableness of the search. 6 '
The court found that both rationales of the automobile exception
justified the search of the Amtrak roomette. First, the brevity of the
stop and mobility of the train presented a risk that the suspect and any
illicit substances would disappear before police could secure a warrant
to search the train. 6 1 Second, the court determined that government
regulation of railroad travel causes train passengers to have a lesser ex-
pectation of privacy when traveling than when in their homes. 65
The Fifth Circuit similarly applied the automobile exception to a
warrantless search of a bus passenger's luggage in United States v.
Johnson.'66 In Johnson a Fort Worth police dispatcher received a call
from an unidentified informant claiming that two armed men intended
to pick up narcotics contained in suitcases stored in bus station lockers
and transport the narcotics to Houston on the bus.67 The officers went
to the station where they observed the suspects retrieve the suitcases.6 8
A porter intercepted the bags and opened them pursuant to instruc-
tions from the police. 6 9 Upon finding the bags filled with crack cocaine,
the police arrested the defendants, who were later convicted of posses-
sion with the intent to distribute.17 0
On appeal, the defendants argued that under United States v.
Chadwick'7' or Arkansas v. Sanders12 the officers could not search the
bags without a warrant once they controlled the suitcases.17 3 In Chad-
wick federal drug agents confiscated a locked footlocker from the trunk
of a car after it was unloaded from a train by suspected drug couriers
and returned with it to Boston's federal building where it was searched
161. Id.




166. 862 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3223 (1989).
167. Id. at 1136.
168. Id. at 1136-37.
169. Id. at 1137.
170. Id.
171. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
172. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
173. Johnson, 862 F.2d at 1138.
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two hours after the suspects had been arrested.17 The Court found that
the suspects had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
the locked trunk,175 and that because the trunk was in the exclusive
control of federal agents at a time and place remote from its initial
seizure, the agents were required to secure a warrant before performing
a search of the trunk's contents. 176 Similarly in Sanders the Supreme
Court found that the automobile exception did not justify the search of
a suitcase taken from the trunk of a taxi.177
The Johnson court, however, distinguished Chadwick and Sanders
because the suspects in both cases had been detained by the police at
the time of the incident. 78 The Fifth Circuit held that because the sus-
pected drug dealers were preparing to leave on a bus and were reasona-
bly believed to be armed, exigent circumstances were created that
justified the warrantless search of the suitcases. 79 The court asserted
that detaining the suspects until the officers obtained a search warrant
would be more intrusive than searching the bags in the back of the bus
terminal. 80 Consistent with Chambers v. Maroney,"'8 the court found
that a warrantless search is justified because the search is no more in-
trusive than detaining suspects until a magistrate issues a warrant. 82
In Chambers police conducted a search of a suspect's car at the
station after the suspect had been taken into custody.8 3 Because of the
delay between arrest and search, the Supreme Court ruled that the
search did not qualify as a search incident to arrest. The Court, how-
ever, upheld the constitutionality of the search, ruling that probable
cause will justify the warrantless search of an automobile, even if the
search is not contemporaneous with arrest, because the alternative is to
hold the car and its occupants until a warrant can be issued.' 8' The
Court distinguished a car from a home or office because of its
mobility. 85
174. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 1. The Supreme Court refused to accept the prosecution's propo-
sal for a luggage exception to the warrantless search or to characterize the search of the trunk as a
search incident to arrest. Id. at 12-13.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Id. at 15-16.
177. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 753.
178. Johnson, 862 F.2d at 1138.
179. Id. at 1139.
180. Id.
181. 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see also infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
182. Johnson, 862 F.2d at 1140.
183. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
184. Id. at 47.
185. Id. at 52. Along with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), Chambers is fre-
quently cited as the cornerstone of the automobile exception. See Note, Search and Seizure: From
Carroll to Ross, The Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 221, 225-28 (1982).
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The Johnson dissent criticized the majority's finding of exigent cir-
cumstances and its application of the automobile exception to a search
of a bus passenger's luggage."8 6 Arguing that Chadwick established that
individuals hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage that
does not exist in automobiles, the dissent rejected the greater or lesser
intrusion rationale of the majority.187 By limiting the automobile excep-
tion to automobiles, the dissent reasoned that bright line boundaries
delineated by the Court and justified by the uniqueness of automobiles
should not be obscured.' Applying the automobile exception to
nonautomobile cases would destroy the boundaries without offering any
limiting principles to guide discretionary police activity.189
It is not clear that Chadwick should preclude the holding in John-
son. Unlike the search of the trunk in Chadwick, the suitcase seized in
Johnson was searched at the time and place of seizure. Additionally,
the threat posed by the fear that the suspects were armed adds an ele-
ment not present in Chadwick, and the consequent need for caution
undeniably influenced the officers to proceed with the search without
first approaching the suspects. On the other hand, the surreptitiousness
of the search-that it was conducted out of public view and without the
owner's knowledge-is troubling. It is perhaps this factor more than
any other that the dissent found ominous.
VI. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES
Consent searches differ conceptually from other exceptions to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Unlike the stop and frisk or
automobile exceptions, if an individual consents to a search, the official
conducting the search need not show cause, suspicion, or exigency of
any kind. 9 ' The state must show only that the consent was voluntary
and was not the product of duress or coercion.' 9 ' Suspects need not
know of their right to refuse consent for a court to find that consent
was given voluntarily. 192 The prosecution maintains the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search. 1 3
If suspects consent to an official search, the search is limited to the
186. Johnson, 862 F.2d at 1141, 1143 (Goldberg, C.J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1143-46.
188. Id. at 1152.
189. Id.
190. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 25, § 8.1.
191. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). Whether a consent to search
is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 248-
49.
192. Therefore, suspects do not have a fourth amendment equivalent of Miranda rights. The
waiver of the right to refuse consent need not be knowing or intelligent. Id. at 246-49.
193. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
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extent of their permission.29 4
Drug enforcement officers commonly approach individuals that
they suspect and request permission to search their belongings or their
person.'95 If the suspect accedes to the request, the officials may con-
duct a search without justifying their suspicions.19 6 By first obtaining
the consent of the suspect, therefore, authorities can reduce the risk of
having any subsequently discovered evidence suppressed at trial.
United States v. Mendenhall 97 illustrates the typical use of the
consensual search in an investigatory encounter. Other cases demon-
strate that similar situations frequently arise in which suspects consent
to a search that they know will produce evidence."9 8 Just as the free to
leave doctrine is based on a fiction that individuals approached by po-
lice will feel free to walk away, the consent doctrine assumes that con-
sent is voluntary if not openly coerced.'9 9 Both doctrines ignore the
implicit coercion engendered solely by the officer's position of authority.
Because of this implicit coercion, suspects often consent to searches and
answer questions asked by police officers even when incriminating evi-
dence surely will be revealed. 00
One significant problem with the consent doctrine that largely is
ignored by the courts is the incentive the consent doctrine provides for
law enforcement personnel to misrepresent facts in order to protect the
admissibility of improperly gained evidence. Trial judges faced with two
DEA agents claiming consent and one or more defendants denying that
consent was given understandably will be hesitant to accept the word of
an individual caught trafficking in drugs. Despite the potential for
abuse, however, courts refuse to install minimal safeguards such as re-
quiring a warning that suspects have the right to refuse their consent.
194. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1980).
195. This practice is frequently reflected in the case law. See, e.g., United States v. Savage,
889 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defendant consented to policeman's request to search cardboard
box where the officer found three kilos of cocaine); United States v. Battista, 876 F.2d 201 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (suspect allowed officer to search suspect's roomette including a suitcase holding more
than 500 grams of cocaine); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989) (suspect allowed
officer to search her purse, which contained cocaine).
196. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
197. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall DEA investigators asked for and received permis-
sion to conduct a body search of the suspect. Id. at 548; see also supra note 138.
198. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
199. This assumption is supported by the Court's adherence to the view that consent will be
deemed voluntary in the absence of physical force. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. The Court re-
jected an argument that the situation might have seemed coercive to the defendant in light of
psychological factors including the defendant's relative youth, minimal education, and the fact
that she was a black female alone in the presence of white officers. Id. at 558.
200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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VII. THE BALANCING TEST-SHOULD GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN
ENFORCING DRUG LAWS OUTWEIGH PERSONAL LIBERTY?
Several theories are proffered to interpret the current trend in
fourth amendment jurisprudence. Some commentators criticize the per-
ceived result-oriented "drug exception" to the fourth amendment and
to civil rights in general. 0' Proponents of this theory persuasively argue
that an exaggerated governmental response to the drug problem re-
flected in jingoistic rhetoric subordinates individual rights to the en-
forcement effort. 02 Courts respond to the antidrug hysteria by
distorting traditional search and seizure analysis in order to produce an
acceptable result at the expense of constitutional protections.0 3
Alternatively, the subordination of individual rights may be viewed
as a consequence of the tremendous weight courts give to the govern-
mental interest in preventing drug trafficking and abuse.204 Because
courts employ a balancing approach to the fourth amendment, the
weight given to drug enforcement initiatives legitimizes increasingly in-
trusive means of detection. Although this view is not inconsistent with
the "drug exception" described above, it does not necessarily implicate
the judiciary in a failure to uphold fourth amendment rights. Instead,
the theory implies that some societal concerns may rise to a critical
level at which individual freedoms are circumscribed in order to make
law enforcement viable.
Commentators suggest that the balancing test is inappropriate for
fourth amendment analysis because courts tend to give full weight to
governmental interests, but fail to address privacy concerns beyond the
specific interest of the individual subject to the search.2 5 The judici-
ary's failure to recognize the by-products of drug courier targeted sur-
veillance supports the theory that individual interests receive
insufficient weight when balanced against governmental interests .2 0  In
201. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 2.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 907-10.
204. See supra note 57.
205. Professor Strossen explains that the costs of any search are typically undervalued "be-
cause the individuals who assert fourth amendment rights in many cases are guilty of criminal
conduct, [and] the Court often ... loses sight of the fact that the search and seizure standards
approved for the guilty will also apply to the innocent." Strossen, supra note 14, at 1195. Con-
versely, the Court overvalues the benefits derived from a search by making "conclusory statements
about the gravity of the law enforcement problem at issue and the contribution of the challenged
law enforcement technique to resolving it." Id. at 1200.
206. Professors Sundby and Strossen argue that governmental interests are given too much
weight, based on an unsupported assumption that each successful search has a positive effect on
the effort to curb drug flow and consequently drug use. On the other hand, the weight given to
individual interest is limited to the interest an individual possesses in not being searched. This
typical formulation fails to account for unsuccessful searches and the cumulative diminishment of
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order to avoid the errors and value judgments that result from applying
the balancing test to constitutional rights, these commentators recom-
mend substitutinig a least intrusive means standard.2" '
The shifting trends in fourth amendment jurisprudence may result
from an irrational focus on drug control at any cost, including the loss
of individual liberties. On the other hand, judicial approval of intrusive
search techniques may stem from an inaccurate balancing test, which
could be remedied by shifting to the more exacting least intrusive
means standard. Regardless of the source behind the shift, however,
current drug enforcement initiatives derive legitimacy from the expan-
sion of fourth amendment exceptions to include search techniques that
make surveillance programs viable.
VIII. Is THERE AN ASSERTABLE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSPORTATION CONTEXT?
The fourth amendment ideally allows the police sufficient discre-
tion to enforce laws, but at the same time protects individuals against
undue governmental intrusions.20 8 In Terry the judiciary recognized the
practical necessity of permitting law enforcement officers to protect
themselves by searching individuals suspected of concealing weapons. 20 9
Extension of the Terry exception to possessory offenses involving nar-
cotics, however, results in a continual erosion of fourth amendment pro-
tection and a consequent subordination of individual privacy interests.
Airline passengers have been particularly vulnerable to post-Terry
analysis. Judicially sanctioned screening measures to protect against hi-
jacking first circumscribed the privacy interest of passengers. Initiatives
stemming from the war on drugs now threaten to eliminate the right
altogether. In the course of surveillance efforts, law enforcement offi-
cials today routinely conduct personal searches, not because the officials
fear for their own safety or the immediate safety of the public, but in
order to intercept drug traffickers. What implications do the regular
and systematic surveillance and frequent search of commercial passen-
gers have for expectations of privacy in the transportation context?
Justice Potter Stewart prefaced his majority opinion in United
States v. Mendenhall2 10 by commenting that the defendant unquestion-
privacy for the population as a whole. See Strossen, supra note 14, at 1195-1204; Sundby, supra
note 13, at 439 (stating that "[a]n intrusion cannot be considered in a vacuum; the balancing test
should account for the intrusion's cumulative effect on the individual's right to be left alone"
(emphasis in original)).
207. See Strossen, supra note 14, at 1254-60; Sundby, supra note 13, at 430-47.
208. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 25, § 9.1(d).
209. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
210. 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
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ably possessed a right to personal security as she made her way through
the airport terminal.2 1' The opinion, however, reduced that constitu-
tionally protected right to little more than the right not to cooperate.
The Court implicitly rejected an interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment that would give citizens the right to be left alone, unhindered by
official interference.212
The Court fails to provide an acceptable solution to the questions
raised by search and seizure in the transportation context. Courts at-
tempt to retain the traditional framework for fourth amendment cases
established by decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but fail to
provide guidance for the extent to which travelers may expect personal
rights of privacy and security to be respected. Terry was intended to
ensure that policemen have discretion adequate to protect themselves
from criminals.13 It serves a crucial purpose in empowering law en-
forcement personnel to frisk and disarm dangerous individuals. The use
of the stop and frisk search as a means to intercept drug traffickers,
however, is less defensible. Furthermore, the systematic use of profiles
by drug enforcement agencies to legitimize the targeting of suspicious
individuals during surveillance is especially bothersome.
The effectiveness of surveillance or the extent to which drug en-
forcement procedures infringe the privacy of the innocent is difficult if
not impossible to determine. Drug courier profiles are both under and
overinclusive primarily because they rely on stereotypes in order to iso-
late potential offenders for further investigation. Once suspected of-
fenders are isolated, the liberal interpretation courts have given to
consent promotes law enforcement techniques that assault the integrity
of the fourth amendment. The prosecution defending a particular
search often presents evidence demonstrating a high rate of accuracy in
searching those suspected of carrying drugs." 4 In an interview with the
211. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 550.
212. "As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the ques-
tions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification." Id. at 554.
The Court found that Mendenhall was not seized because she was free to leave even though
agents admitted that in fact they would not have allowed the defendant to exit had she attempted
to do so. Id. at 554 & n.6. In a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, three Justices found
that the defendant was in fact seized, but that the agents had reasonable grounds on which to
justify a seizure. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
Consequently, after Mendenhall police may make an investigatory stop without showing
cause, provided that no threats or force curtail the detainee's liberty. The fiction behind Menden-
hall, that an ordinary citizen approached by the police would feel free to leave if the police em-
ployed no overt threats or force, undermines the Court's assertion that a person walking through a
public terminal reserves his right to personal security.
213. Terry, 292 U.S. at 30.
214. In Mendenhall, for example, the concurring opinion found that seizure of the defendant
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Washington Post, the spokesman for the Washington, D.C. DEA field
office estimated that agents in Union Station stop, question, and search
as many as fifty people for every arrest.215 Unfortunately, victims rarely
report violative searches that fail to produce contraband. ' Conse-
quently, the extent to which individual rights are violated by intrusive
searches by law enforcement officials because of inexact surveillance
techniques is difficult to ascertain.
Despite Justice Stewart's assertion that an individual in a public
terminal possesses the constitutional right of personal security, 17 gen-
eral trends in search and seizure jurisprudence suggest otherwise. Drug
enforcement surveillance initiatives necessarily clash with fourth
amendment protections. As courts increasingly become reluctant to
deem searches stemming from drug enforcement initiatives unreasona-
ble, passengers in airport corridors and train or bus stations will con-
tinue to find their rights to personal security circumscribed.
IX. CONCLUSION
Regular and systematic surveillance evokes images of an omnipo-
tent and intrusive government. Despite suggestions of abuse and unfair-
ness, however, the Court shows no inclination to safeguard fourth
amendment rights against efforts to target drug couriers. By resorting
to a fact specific balancing test, courts continue to subordinate individ-
ual privacy rights to an elevated governmental interest in enforcing
drug laws. The result indicates an elimination of any expectation of pri-
vacy rights for passengers.
Alexandra Coulter*
was justified in light of the success rate demonstrated by DEA agents in the Detroit Airport. In the
first 18 months of the DEA's Detroit program agents searched 141 persons and arrested 122 of
those searched. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring).
215. Civil Liberties Caught in Antidrug Cross Fire; Aggressive Law Enforcement Gains
Support, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1989, at D1, col. 5.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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